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Abstract
This paper briefly describes a technique for improving capacity and oper-
ational stability of busy mainline junctions and stations. The technique,
called the SafeCap advisory system, employs a mixture of existing train
monitoring and control technologies to introduce an advisory control layer
on top of fixed-block signalling. We present the main design principles and
illustrate the advantages of the proposed solution with some experiments
conducted in a train simulation toolkit.
1 Introduction
Static optimisation of junctions and stations critically depends on knowledge
about train schedules and traffic mix. There is a danger of over-optimising
to such a degree that stability is heavily compromised. To counter this,
static optimisation should be somewhat defensive and leave some slack in
train spacing. Real-time control can make the best use of this slack by
assessing, in real time, the current state of trains around a station, acting to
reconfigure signalling and, if applicable, ATO (Automated Train Operation)
programmes.
Automated Train Operation-capable trains and moving-block signalling
present the best opportunities for real-time control. The main function of
the latter is an accurate projection of the current train configuration and
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Figure 1: A CUDA-based [1] simulation can explore many millions of control
scenarios in just a few seconds, to predict and pre-empt delays &
disruptions..
control commands into the future. By projecting a set of alternative control
scenarios, one can explore future configurations and choose the locally opti-
mal control. Control software could alter acceleration/ braking curves, set
individual train speed limits, adjust dwelling times, and choose platforms.
It should allow a system to be quickly stabilised should there be a need
to accommodate an extra train, recover from train delays, and, generally,
sustain a high rate of train flow when there are limited opportunities for
implementing stability margins in a schedule.
Albeit a simple idea, technologically realtime control is extremely chal-
lenging. To provide meaningful control logic for each particular station, and
to be able to predict the time of arrival and the speed of approaching trains,
one needs to consider a large context area. Furthermore, finding an optimum
in such a setting is bound to rely on probabilistic and genetic algorithms
that require a fairly large test base, in the order of tens of millions of control
scenarios. Such scenarios would have to be generated and processed within a
tiny time budget: one to ten seconds. Fortunately, the problem is amenable
to massive parallelisation, and there are computer science techniques and
specialised hardware to achieve this today.
Fig 1 illustrates a schematic representation of a railway model, where each
train’s behaviour is pre-computed depending on the state of the route inter-
locking. Essentially, before commencing movement each train computes a
number of scenarios in its near horizon, and selects to act upon the one which
renders an optimal track capacity. Since at every time slice such a compu-
tation is carried by every train present in the simulation, the horizon might
be increasingly more difficult to compute, being influenced directly propor-
tional by the number of trains present. Hence, a parallel implementation
is a good candidate for an optimisation which has potential for drastically
increasing overall efficiency.
2 Overview
Our aim is to improve capacity and operational stability of a railway net-
work. By capacity we understand the ability of a network to accommodate
specific traffic schedules. The stability property ensures that railway oper-
ation is able to recover (i.e., run to schedule) promptly after a disruption
caused by a late or unscheduled train.
One common technique for assessing capacity is the UIC 406 “Capacity
Calculation Method” [2] that measures how well a given layout and sig-
nalling are able to accommodate some specific schedule and whether there is
enough capacity left to introduce extra traffic. Stability is achieved through
a degree of redundancy in the spatial domain: time gaps between successive
trains are used to mitigate knock-on effect of delayed trains and isolated
’service’ gaps help to schedule unplanned traffic.
The measures advocated by UIC 406 to increase stability achieve this at
the expense of capacity: time gaps between trains mean fewer trains per
unit of time. Time gaps may be smaller if the trains are slower (on average)
but this again severely impacts capacity. Thus, for the critical sections of
railway infrastructure, traditional schedule-based approach to capacity and
stability is too restricting.
At a finer level of granularity, the available capacity of a network is dis-
tributed quite unevenly. A straight sections of track offer offers more capac-
ity than, for instance, a curved one (assuming a speed limit is enforced on
a curved section). Not much can be done to rectify this other constructing
new tracks or using tilting trains. However, the major sources of capacity
restriction are areas where tracks intersect and trains stop, i.e., junctions
and stations. And, unlike curved tracks, we believe there is an opportunity
for capacity improvement in junctions and stations by adding a train advi-
sory layer on top of the existing signalling and interlocking. The guiding
idea is to redistribute capacity consumption from areas of restricted capac-
ity (junctions, stations) to areas where there may be an excess capacity
(e.g., straight line). Our thesis is that this leads the better overall capacity
utilisation.
Another important step is realising that assessing in static context, with
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Figure 2: Sample layout.
a layout and schedule alone, necessarily leads to conservative solutions that
try to minimize occurrence of significant service degradation at the cost
of somewhat lower overall performance. In contrast, a reactive control sys-
tem, operating in real-time, has far more opportunities for delivering higher
capacity as extreme events may be ruled out with a high degree of confidence
for the time window of control.
As an illustration, consider the layout in Fig. 2. Assume that running
trains over a path entering the layout at A and leaving at B delivers capacity
cap(A B) when there is no traffic on other paths; let us denote the same
metric for paths from C to D and from C to E as cap(C D) and cap(C E ).
Also let cap(p1 , . . . , pn) be the overall capacity of simultaneous traffic on
paths p1, . . . , pn. For our example we have that
cap(A B) + cap(C E) = cap(A B,C E)
cap(A B) + cap(A B) ≤ cap(A B,C D)
In other words, when some paths share an area of track the resulting
interference may prevent attaining the full capacity of each path considered
in isolation. Whereas paths do not interfere, like A B and C E in our exam-
ple, their combined capacity is a simple summation of individual capacities.
If we account for the interference between some two path pi and pj with
the term int(pi, pj) ≥ 0 then the overall capacity is sum of isolated path
capacities minus the overall path interference:
cap(p1, . . . , pn) =
∑
i
cap(pi)−
∑
i 6=j
int(pi, pj) (1)
Hence, to maximize capacity one needs to minimize term
∑
i 6=j int(pi, pj).
The inference of paths pi and pj is a consequence of interference of indi-
vidual trains on these paths, i.e., the delays introduced on either path due
traffic on another path. The ordering of trains on a path may be fixed
by a route reservation policy, commonly defined in a train schedule. Our
approach, however, requires a degree of flexibility in route reservation where
the priority of reservation of routes with shared track elements is dynami-
cally computed by the proposed advisory system.
3 Control and optimisation
Interference int(pi, pj) may be determined from the observation of train
runs (using, for instance. a simulator tool) and comparing the measured
capacity cap(pi, pj) to cap(pi) + cap(pj). Each of these terms is completely
defined by a record of individual train runs - record of train position over
time. A detailed train run is a costly to compute and manipulate for a
railway junction of any significant size. This limitation becomes prohibitive
in the context of real-time control. In lieu of a suitable explicit form of term
int(pi, pj) that gives an accurate quantitative measure of interference, it is
necessary to devise a simpler, proxy metric that only correlates with actual
interference value to provide a qualitative measure of interference.
As such metric we propose to employ a record of times when circuits
containing points are locked and freed by trains. Such a record T , defines,
for each point, a sequence which elements are triples of path, circuit entry
time and circuit occupation time:
T =
{
Rj : . . . , (p
j
i , τ
j
i ,∆
j
i ), (p
j
i+1, τ
j
i+1,∆
j
i+1), . . . , (p
j
ik
, τ jik ,∆
j
ik
), . . .
. . . : . . .
In the above, Rj is the name of a train detection circuit (e.g, AD in Fig.
2) which contains point(s) or diamond crossing(s); pji are path identifiers;
τ ji ,∆
j
i are positive real values that define the moment and extent of time
when circuit Rj was occupied by a train from the respective path.
The example in Fig. 3 shows simulated run over the layout from Fig. 2
obtained with the SafeCap modelling platform [3]. Six trains, divided evenly
between paths AB and CD are scheduled to enter the layout in 25 second
intervals and trains on AB have priority in route reservation. The time vs.
distance plot in 3 shows the first train on CD being delaying on signal S22.
Other CD trains are also slightly delayed by traffic on AB. Slightly wobble
of the AB distance plot is the effect of sub-optimal two aspect signalling.
AD : (AB, 126.9, 8.9), (AB, 278.9, 9.1), (CD, 353.6, 11.6), (CD, 476.7, 11.7), . . .
BD : (CD, 351.7, 5.6), (CD, 474.35, 4.94), (CD, 403.6, 5.1)
Figure 3: Train run plot and shared circuit traversal histories. In green (light
gray) are trains on paths between nodes A,B; in red (dark gray)
are trains between nodes C,D. All trains are the same.
Fig. 3 also gives an excerpt of shared circuit traversal histories. One point
of interest is that the second train on line CD occupies AD for a somewhat
shorter duration of time, i.e., it enters circuit boundary with a higher speed.
By changing train schedule and introducing extra delays (i.e., an extra
stop or longer dwelling time), one may observe a differing record T ′. It is
useful to identify the ways some two records T and T ′ may differ. One
possibility is that a train arrives at the boundary of a circuit slightly later
or earlier and occupies it for a different duration of time. We record such a
change with a transformation rule shift:
shift(T, j, i, t0, t1) =
{
Rj : . . . , (p
j
i , τ
j
i + t0,∆
j
i + t1), . . .
. . . : . . .
One may also observe, due to a differing schedule or a change in route
reservation policy, a different order of paths in the history record of a circuit.
Rule swap defines a transformation where two previously adjacent paths pjis
and pjis+1 are swapped:
swap(T, j, i) =
{
Rj : . . . , (p
j
i+1, τ
j
i+1,∆
j
i+1), (p
j
ii
, τ jii ,∆
j
ii
), . . .
. . . : . . .
If the traffic pattern remains invariant (i.e., the same number trains travel
over same paths), any possible record T ′ may be obtained from any other
record T by applying a sequence S of transformation rules shift and swap:
T ′ = S(T ). As a notation short-cut, we treat S as a composite rule formed
by a successive application of individual rules it is comprised from.
The notion of transformation rules may be used to define a measure of
how close two records T and T ′ are. Let S∗ be the set of all rule sequences
such that for any s ∈ S∗ it holds that T ′ = s(T ). Then the distance ‖T−T ′‖
between records T and T ′ is defined as follows:
‖T − T ′‖ =
∑
i
‖si‖ where s = arg min
s
card(s),
s is the shortest rule sequence, si is the i-th transformation rule in s and ‖si‖
is a transformation rule distance metric, defined by the following (empirical)
formulae:
‖shift(T, j, i, t0, t1)‖ = |t1|+
√
|t0| ‖swap(T, j, i)‖ = |τ ji+1 − τ jii |.
Here |x| signifies the absolute value of x.
The essence of our technique is based on the following conjecture: small
(large) variations in record history distance ‖T − T ′‖ correspond to small
(large) variations in interference value int(pi, . . . , pk). In other words, met-
ric ‖T − T ′‖ provides a qualitative characterisation of capacity change.
3.1 Real-time control
The SafeCap [4] advisory system implements a real-time control loop for the
supervision of train movement at the sub-signalling level with the aim of
increasing overall system capacity or meeting specific operation goals. It is
assumed that the system has a complete view of a controlled area including
position and velocity of each train and the state of movable track equipment.
This view cumulatively defines the sensors of the control system. Its sole
actuator - the way it influences train behaviour - is the command interface
to an automated train operation subsystem (ATO), assumed to be already
in place. The control system issues commands to ATO to slow down or speed
up specific trains. The core of the control is an optimisation procedure based
on the notion of shared circuit traversal history, presented above. An optimal
control is identified by finding a sequence of transformation rules s leading
to a significant and positive change in capacity.
The diagram in Fig. 4 presents the overall architecture of the developed
control system. The first step, state snapshot, polls railway infrastructure
state 
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Figure 4: SafeCap real-time control system.
and sensing equipment to acquire train and equipment state. A simulator
tool is instantiated with the captured state and its simulation run provides
the initial record history T .
The solution generation step employs a probabilistic procedure to gen-
erate a set of transformation sequences S(1) such that, at this stage, each
sequence has just one transformation rule. The procedure is guided by the
‖T − s(T )‖, s ∈ S(1) metric to filter away all transformations s where
‖T − s(T )‖ is either too small (i.e., likely to give insignificant change in
capacity) or too large (unlikely to correspond to any actual train runs).
Early filtering is essential as the number of potential solutions is very large.
In general, we are looking for solutions that are likely to yield signif-
icantly different performance. Many of these solutions will offer a lower
capacity than the original situation; some proportion may also be not real-
izable. Realizability of transformation rules {s1, . . . , sk} requires that every
train, starting from the captured state, is able, in a simulator tool, to meet
the constraints of every T ′ = si(T ), i ∈ 1..k. To remove solutions which
unrealisable or offer lower performance, we employ an event-based train
simulator to quickly confirm the capacity utilisation and the feasibility of
the imposed constraints. The capacity utilisation metric may be a general
purpose one (i.e., track utilisation) or specific to an area and situation (e.g.,
station call punctuality).
The result is a set S(1)f ⊆ S(1) of viable one-step transformation sequences.
We call such set the first-ply solution and, more generally, refer to S(n)f as
n-th ply solution. The ply index describes how far, in the terms of shared
circuits, the optimisation procedure has advanced. The first ply solution
considers only the initial points and crossings on each paths, the second ply
adds all the second ones, and so on. Each ply adds a new dimension to the
solution space: each transformation sequence s from ply i is expanded to a
set of sequences q such that s is a prefix for every sequence in q.
The set of first-ply solutions is fed back into the solution generation pro-
cedure to obtain the candidate set S(2) of second-ply solutions. –These are
again filtered by realizability and capacity estimates and provide the basis
for the next ply. The depth of the solution generation procedure is limited
by the number of circuits with movable elements that occur on a path. The
largest such number (i.e., a path with three points, all on separate circuits)
defines the index of the last ply.
Once all solutions are generated and filtered, those remaining are ranked
to identify one optimal solution. The ranking criteria is specific to the cur-
rent operational goals and the area controlled.
The control loop executed every 5 to 10 seconds. This time window is
small enough to maintain a useful degree of feedback in the control loop and
large enough to be able to consider a large number of potential solutions.
We apply certain heuristics to generate a set of candidate solutions (trans-
formation sequences). This is set S(i) before filtering with ‖T−s(T )‖metric.
For each transformation rule there is a separate heuristics. We first apply
the swap heuristic to obtain a reordering of shared circuit traversal and
afterwards use the shift heuristic to attempt to increase performance of
each specific reordering.
3.2 The swap heuristic
The aim of the swap heuristic is to generate a relatively small number of
promising candidate solutions by changing order trains over shared circuits.
The key idea is that the that the likelihood of swapping some two paths
pji+1 and p
j
ii
decreases with the time distance between |τ ji+1 − τ jii | between
these instances of traversal. Thus, if some two trains travel over a point one
right after another, the heuristic is likely to generate a candidate solution
where the order of the trains are swapped for this point. If the trains are
separated by a considerable time gap, the swap becomes less likely.
The following recursive function describes the major steps of swap heuris-
tics. It is variant of a simulated annealing algorithm.
Fig. 5 demonstrates an application of the heuristic to the example from
Figure 5: Train runs of optimal solution; the left plot is an optimal train
ordering by the swap heuristic; the right also plot adds the speed
control of shift heuristic.
Data: history T , per-path energy E and termination tolerance 
Result: set S of transformation sequences
begin
S ← ∅
while
∑
iEi >  do
t← |τ ji+1 − τ jii |
r ← random(0, 1)
if e−t/(Ei+Ej) > r) then
Ei ← Ei − t, Ej ← Ej − t
S ← S ∪ genswap(swap(T, i, j), E, )
end
end
return S
end
Function genswap(T , E, )
Fig. 2. An optimal solution here is the alternating order of trains. This
heuristic determined between 6 or 7 (depending on random seed) candidate
solutions out of 720 possible combinations. The best of the solutions (Fig. 5,
left) delivers 21% increase in track utilisation having considered. The worst
of these solutions delivers 17 % capacity decrease.
3.3 The shift heuristic
The aim of this heuristics is to adjust the way a train approaches the bound-
ary of a route containing a shared train circuit. With conventional signalling,
a train slowing down to a red signal has no knowledge of the cause of the
signal being red nor how soon the cause will cease to be and let the signal
show a permissive aspect.
We are going to override this behaviour and guide the train to approach
a red signal at speed. Knowing the position and capabilities of each train, it
is possible to predict exactly the point of time when the route containing a
shared circuits becomes available to any given train. Thus, we can command
a train to arrive at the route boundary right at the moment the route is
available for the train.
No matter how long a train had to wait for a point and its containing
route to be allocated to the train, the moment this happens the train should
be entering the route with the maximum feasible speed. Given this rule is
maintained for all the trains, the occupation of the critical sections of rail-
ways (those containing points and switching crossing) is minimized (within
the limitation of a current solution).
Although such behaviour does not violate route-based signalling princi-
ples (train should never pass a red signal), the risk of passing a red signal
increases as a train approaches it at speed. Two principal safety violation
scenarios are having train on a circuit of route and the fault in a movable
track equipment. The former case may be largely excluded with a small
(e.g., 5 sec.) control window: the advisory system would be able to detect
stationary or unusually slow train and direct other trains accordingly. The
latter case when, for instance, a point lock is not acquired, can be managed
by ascertaining that at all times there is a sufficient braking distance for
ATP to stop a train in front of a faulty point.
The righ-hand side plot in Fig. 5 shows a combination of the optimal
solution found by swap and approach speed control computed by the shift
heuristic. As evident from the plots, the heuristic prevents two of the trains
from stopping and thus making them traverse the shared area quicker. This
deliver approx. 8% increase in capacity.
3.4 Synthesising ATO control
The selected optimal solution (in the form of transformation sequence sj)
must be transformed into a set of train control rules.
The first step consists in overriding of the existing route reservation and
point locking schedule in order to realise swap rules of the optimal solution
sj . Since from T ′ we order the relative order of traversal of every shared
circuit (and thus point and diamond crossing), it is not straightforward to
compute such new route reservation schedule.
The second kind of rules, the shift rule, speeds up or slows down a train.
The effect of these rules is synthesised using a dedicated simulation proce-
dure where train time of traversal of shared circuits is reflected in waypoints
on a train path.
A waypoint W = (d, t) is defined by its offset d within the train path and
the arrival time t. If every train respects the constraints set by waypoints,
one would observer history record T ′ = sj(T ) (record T is a project of state
snapshot based on signalling and scheduling rules alone).
The set of waypoints are handed over to a third-party ATO subsystem.
This subsystem is assumed to analyse waypoints for feasibility and safety
and generate corresponding driving profiles. It the obligation of the ATO
subsystem to reject waypoints that may violate signalling constraints. If any
single waypoint is rejected, all waypoints are cleared and the system falls
back, until the next control window, into it original state.
4 Conclusion
We have briefly presented out findings on real-time advisory control system.
The system attempts to stabilise performance in presence of disturbances
by issuing ATO control commands computed by a relatively simple optimi-
sation engine. We are working on applying the technique to a large-scale,
real world railway operation spanning busy stations.
The system illustrated in the present paper is aimed at computing a
myriad of scenarios for each entity in order to determine the optimal solu-
tion in terms of track capacity at any given time-step and route region.
By taking advantage of the multi-core graphics processor, the simulation
could compute scenarios into the future for each train entity in parallel,
simultaneously, and return the optimal scenario, therefore increasing the
computation speed that the CPU would have to carry. In addition to that,
a very large number of train entities could be simulated in parallel using
the appropriate hardware and memory management paradigms.
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